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Abstract 
Over the last decade, the activities of ethnic/religious insurgent groups have permeated the Nigerian nation, 
bringing into question the essence of survival of the Nigeria project. This ranges from the activities of the 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Niger Delta Volunteer Force, the 
indigene/settler crisis in many states, and the Boko Haram saga in the North-East region. Several factors ranging 
from economic, political and cultural marginalization, widening social inequalities, lack of basic infrastructure 
and exclusion have been cited as reasons for these insurgencies in order to attract attention from the national 
government and the international world. It is the contention in this paper that employing tactics of violence and 
killings against innocent individuals, communities and armed conflict within the state creates long-term 
devastating consequences than the short–term goal of attracting attention to whatever genuine demands any 
group may hold. The paper further argues that insurgency results from leadership failure, lack of accountability, 
political exclusion and marginalization which create conditions where the most vulnerable, particularly women 
and children, are more at the risk of hunger, malnutrition, susceptibility to illnesses and death. Furthermore, 
countries in conflict suffer disruptions in livelihoods, infrastructure, schools, markets, assets, nutrition, health 
and loss of resources required for food production and distribution, including national development. The end 
result is that instead of the country advancing in building sustainable development, the perpetration of conflict 
and violence causes the country to suffer long-lasting losses, including losses to food production and societal 
advancement. The paper concludes with the recommendation that employing constructive non-violent dialogue 
and demanding accountability from leadership in all spheres of life and authority will go a long way in 
addressing socioeconomic challenges faced in the country. It will also galvanize our collective drive, energies 
and resources in generating more secure livelihoods for the population currently mired in poverty, hunger and 
insecurity.   
Keywords: Insurgency, Nation-building, livelihoods, development, governance. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Good governance has been recognized over the past two decades as a major policy consideration that 
makes a critical difference to development and poverty reduction in most developing countries (Egharevba and 
Chiazor, 2013; UN, 1998) Where governance is weak or deficient it is difficult to imagine how equitable 
development can take place and where there is wide inequity the chances that some sections of the society will 
be left to live in poverty and misery are enormous. Since the 1980s, the issue of poor governance has been a 
major cause of poverty and underdevelopment in majority of countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The 
World Bank (1989:60-61) declared that ‘a crisis of governance’ underlay ‘the litany of Africa’s development 
problems.’ This fact was further corroborated by Hyden et al. (1992:5) who opined that: “African crisis is 
identified and perceived as governance crisis.” Besides, in a well cited quote, Kofi Annan noted that, ‘good 
governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development (UN 
1998). Paradoxically, while many African countries including Nigeria are endowed with rich natural resources 
that could be transformed into better living conditions for the populace, yet majority of their citizens live in 
poverty and misery, lacking the capacity to do things they would want to do in life (Sen, 1999). Good 
governance is credited for responsiveness to the needs of the wider population especially the poor and vulnerable 
groups who normally benefit from pro-poor policies and programmes of the state. Good governance therefore 
entails the process of translating societal demands into choices, resulting in policy formulation and 
implementation through applying the principles of accountability, transparency, participation and predictability. 
In the context of human development, the UNDP (2002) conceived good governance as “…democratic 
governance”, meaning respect for human rights, public participation in decision making, accountability, poverty 
reduction, responsiveness, equal treatment, inclusiveness, fairness, impartiality, absence of any discriminatory 
practices as well as preserving the needs of future generations. In sum, good governance is perhaps seen as the 
single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development (UN 1998). 
 
When these values are eroded or absent in a country’s push for development with respect to the management of a 
country’s affairs and resources at all levels, questions often are raised about the exercise of economic, political 
and administrative authority to establish social and economic development; the manner in which the 
power/authority is exercised; the process by which public institutions conduct public affairs; including the 
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capacity of government to design, formulate, shape and implement public policies, discharge functions and 
provide goods and services (World Bank, 1989:61; 1994:14; 2007a; UNDP 2007:2-3;128; Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi 2009:5). It also brings to fore the traditions by which power or authority in a country is used; the  
processes, institutions and mechanism through which citizens and social groups articulate their interests, exercise 
their legal rights, mediate their differences, assess the role of political authorities in establishing the enabling 
environment in which economic operators function and in determining the distribution of benefits as well as the 
nature of relationships between the ruler and the ruled (OECD, 1995:14). These concerns raised become evident 
when different social groups in society feels short-changed, dominated, marginalized or discriminated against in 
accessing the benefits that power or authority provides which ultimately engenders the creation of 
socioeconomic and political divisions along class, ethnic, religious or regional lines which in turn heightened 
tensions, mistrust, conflicts that ultimately threaten national unity and development. The more these conditions 
permeate a given society the more it undermines the push for collective nationalism and common vision which 
create an atmosphere in which social groups become more self-conscious, politically oriented, assertive and 
ultimately define themselves as ethnic groups with a sense of solidarity of consciousness characterized by 
congruity with their own values, symbols, myths, customs, symbols,  birth  and blood, beliefs, common 
ancestry/enemies and historical attachment to a particular territory   (Horowitz, 1985; Ake, 2000:92-93). These 
various social groups begin to position themselves with the resolve to push for political power with the result 
that in most polyethnic countries in Africa such as Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Togo, Kenya, Ghana, Code d’ Voire, 
ethnic competition tended to characterized the peoples socioeconomic and political relations, thus making the 
quest for power intense and prone to all sort of lawlessness and violence.  
 
Conflicts between ethnic groups and within them are not inevitable nor are they eternal. They arises out of 
specific historical and material forces and situations; are moulded by particular and unique circumstances, and 
are constructed to serve certain interests by idealists and ideologues, visionaries and opportunists, political 
leaders and ‘ethnic power brokers’ of various kinds (Stavenhagen 1994:2; Ake, 2000:95).  Prior to the attainment 
of independence and beyond, the policy of indirect rule which the British adopted for running Nigeria had 
already set the stage for regionalization of nationalist leadership when the main administrative and political units 
of Nigeria were made to coincide with the spatial locations of the major nationalities of Nigeria, the Yoruba, Ibo 
and Hausa-Fulani. This regionalization got firmer when the colonial government decided to devolve power to the 
regions in the 1954 constitution. This situation set the stage for the nature that Nigerian political system took 
before independence and beyond, characterized by varying centrifugal forces such as the widespread anxiety 
about domination, marginalization and subjugation which clearly undermined the Nigerian project and the quest 
for nation-building (Minorities Commission, 1959:2).   In the events following independence, such as the 
declaration of the state of emergency in the West, the crisis arising from 1962/63 and 1963/64 census, the 
general election into the House of Representative and the elections to the Western House of Assembly in January 
and October 1965, it was obvious that the Nigerian political system had broken down due to the rise in the 
solidarity of ethnic consciousness driven by material and historical forces (Lieberman and Singh, 2009). By now 
the political crisis had become so deep that the viability of Nigeria began to look doubtful and it did not help 
matters that this crisis was presented to the popular consciousness as a struggle over ethnic domination. 
 
The result that followed was a military coup in January 1966, a counter coup in July of the same year and 
eventual bloody civil war in 1967 that lasted 30 months. Since then, political ethnicity had permeated the 
governance process just as the era of military rule had consistently undermined the state building project. 
Military rule did nothing to curb ethnic consciousness but its conflictual manifestations, and only to a limited 
extent. It ruled Nigeria like a unitary state and exacerbated the fears of domination partly because it was 
generally perceived as lacking objectivity, a replay of the problem which the Minorities Commission has 
identified as the bane of political integration and democratic political stability in Nigeria. Besides, the coercive 
ecumenicism of military rule and its arbitrary power alienated people from the state and drove them to traditional 
solidarities. It also could not mediate pluralism but rather accentuated the divisive potentialities of social 
pluralism given its failure to comprehend the need for negotiated consensus. This condition increased the 
premium on power as well as the motivation of subordinate groups and classes to overturn the prevailing 
political order. For it led to strong demand for democratization amid strong antipathies for military rule. The 
antipathy of Nigerians to military rule became so strong and the objectives of ending military rule so compelling 
that the Nigerian people became more united; attention shifted from religious, nationalist and ethnic solidarity. 
Particularly interesting to note is the dialectics of military rule in first giving impetus to ethnic consciousness and 
then helping to create the conditions for transcending it. This dialectic was also demonstrated in the 1993 
presidential elections when the citizenry voted against the National Republican Convention (NRC), the party 
reputedly preferred by the military and the conservative wing of the political class in alliance with it. It is these 
foregoing issues therefore that provide the necessity for interrogating the issue of ethnic/religious insurgencies 
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that has reared its ugly head in the nation’s polity since the return to civilian rule in 1999 and its consequences 
for nation-building in Nigeria. This is significant as state or nation building cannot be wished or imposed, but a 
product of conscious statecraft built by exemplary men and women with vision and resolve. Above all, it is about 
building a common sense of purpose, shared destiny and collective belonging and community. To address these 
issues raised, the paper will be organized into five sections. Following the introduction, section two addresses 
itself with the concept of ethnic and religious insurgency as well as highlighting the factors that trigger its 
occurrence in societies. Section three focuses on analyzing the concept of nation-building and the obstacle to its 
sustenance. Section four provides the theoretical anchor for understanding insurgencies in societies as well as the 
analysis of its effects on the nation-building project for the Nigerian nation. Section five ends with the 
conclusions. 
 
ETHNIC/ RELIGIOUS INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA 
Since independence, religious and ethnic rhetoric has leveraged claims to political representation and 
opportunities. This often degenerates into fierce zero-sum conflicts leading to ethnic violence and political 
disintegration. This concern was raised by Lancaster (1991:158) that: 
…political divisions would increasingly fall along ethnic or regional lines, heightening 
tensions and, ultimately threatened national unity. The volcano of ethnic or clan strife remains 
dormant throughout much of sub-Saharan Africa. It could erupt- as it has in recent years in 
Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan-should ethnicity became the leading 
factor in the struggle for power.  
 
Corruption and incompetent leadership have added another wrinkle, preventing the equitable distribution of 
resources and opportunities and making the politics of religious and ethnic exclusivity more appealing. 
Mismanagement of national resources and misrule by multi-ethnic and multi-religious coalitions of successive 
rulers have impoverished and denied opportunities to majority of Nigerians. As a result, religious rhetoric 
blaming members of other ethnic/religious communities and proposals for religious reform as a solution to 
society’s ills have found purchase among the masses. This genuine, if misplaced, quest for a religious utopia has 
given some opportunistic political gladiators an excuse to curry legitimacy through politicized appeals to piety 
and religious fervor.  
 
Modern Nigeria emerged through the merging of two British colonial protectorates or territories in 1914. The 
amalgamation was an act of colonial convenience and made little or no sense to the sensibility of the Nigerian 
people since the policies adopted to turn the Nigerian project into reality were self defeating as it engender 
centrifugal tendencies where the colonial state relied heavily on hostile force to subjugate the indigenous people 
which drove them to traditional solidarity groups such as ethnic or national groups. These solidarity groups 
became centres of resistance and means of self actualization against the colonizer’s integrative policies and 
acculturation as well as network for survival which provided their members a rudimentary social welfare system, 
thus making them the primary focus of political allegiance rather than the state. The amalgamation has often 
been invoked by Nigerians as the foundation of the rancorous relationship between the two regions of Nigeria. 
The Northern region, now broken into several states and three geopolitical blocs, is largely Muslim. It was the 
center of a precolonial Islamic empire called the Sokoto Caliphate, and its Muslim populations, especially those 
whose ancestors had been part of the caliphate, generally look to the Middle East and the wider Muslim world 
for solidarity and sociopolitical example. The Southern part, an ethnically diverse region containing many states 
and three geopolitical units, is largely Christian. The major sociopolitical influences there are Western and 
traditional African culture. The regionalization got firmer when the British colonial government decided to 
devolve power to the regions, following the 1954 Constitution, which was often described as the ‘regionalist 
constitution’. This event set in place the process of regionalization and the rise of political ethnicity which the 
political elite have harped on in their quest for control of state power. These differences have been a source of 
political disagreements and suspicions between the two regions since colonial times. To add to this cauldron, 
each of the two regions contains ethnic and religious minorities who harbour grievances against ethnic and 
religious majorities they see as hegemonic oppressors. These grievances are sometimes expressed through bitter 
political complaints/conflicts; intense and lawless competition, sectarian crises and violent insurgencies stoked 
by political elites who use it to maintain the status quo and defend its power through spreading the belief that the 
ethnic group is collectively in power (give examples of such violent insurgencies). 
 
It is interesting to note that while Nigeria was being ethnicized in this way, it was nonetheless possible to forge a 
country-wide solidarity to struggle against colonialism. Indeed, the traditionalization of modernity under 
colonialism contributed directly to the provenance and strength of the nationalist movement. One can already 
begin to see how ethnic consciousness and political ethnicity wax and wane. At one historical conjuncture, a 
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national solidarity holds in the face of policies which were encouraging ethnic political identities. At another, 
political ethnicity grows strong and defeat national outlook. It is useful to explore this dialectics of ethnic 
consciousness by looking at the responses of colonial policies to nationalist pressures, responses which 
effectively defined the path to independence. By the British policy of indirect rule adopted in Nigeria, the stage 
was already set for the regionalization of nationalist leadership when the main administrative and political units 
were made to coincide with the spatial locations of the major nationalities. This was the context of the rising tide 
of ethnonationalism which marked Nigeria’s march to independence and beyond. For instance, between 1947 
and 1959 Nigerian nationalist leaders from different regional, ethnic, and religious communities came together in 
a series of conferences and parliaments to negotiate the transition to self-rule and to map out a common future. 
During these interactions and in the first few years after independence in 1960, the jarring effects of arbitrary 
colonial unification manifested as seemingly irreconcilable differences of aspirations, priorities, and visions. So 
deep were these religious and ethnic antagonisms that one Northern Nigerian Muslim nationalist leader declared 
Nigeria “the mistake of 1914” while a prominent Southern Nigerian Christian nationalist figure called Nigeria “a 
mere geographic expression.” This politics degenerated into a rather lawless struggle which exposed the 
structural weakness of the Nigerian state which lacked autonomy and capacity to rise above the conflicts and 
struggles among particularistic interests. Here, the state is largely privatized, alien, remote, uncaring and 
oppressive for majority of the citizens. This is because in the context of nation-states in Nigeria, political 
competition is ultimately about the control of power and an instrument for serving the self centred interests of 
the elite.     
 
The desperate advancement of ethnic/religious solutions to socioeconomic and political problems have deepened 
social fissures and spawned extremist and violent insurgencies such as the ongoing Boko Haram Islamist 
terrorist campaign, which has killed and maimed Christians and Muslims alike. This seed of extremist and 
violent insurgencies was sown through the British colonial system of Indirect Rule, a divide and rule system that 
required sharp ethno-religious differentiation among Nigerians, making religion and ethnicity the preeminent 
markers of identity and pushed exclusionary identity politics into the political arena and thus serves as a means 
of accessing political and economic resources. Since colonial times and post-independent period, ethnic/religious 
differences and animosities have exacerbated political crises and have been implicated in major national 
conflicts such as the Nigerian civil war, the Jos crisis to mention but a few.  
 
Insurgency on the other hand, is an armed rebellion against a constituted authority. It is a technology of military 
conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare.  As a form of warfare 
insurgency can be harnessed to diverse political agendas, motivations, and grievances. Conceptually, insurgency 
can be defined as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use 
of subversion and armed conflict (US Department of Defense, 2007:263). More broadly, it is “an organized 
protracted political-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established 
government, occupying power or other political authority while increasing insurgent control (Department of the 
Army and US Marine Corps, 2006:1). In other word, the common denominator for most insurgent groups is their 
objective of gaining control of a population or a particular territory, including its resources. This objective 
differentiates insurgent groups from purely terrorist organizations. Although, terrorist organizations with 
revolutionary aspirations seem to meet the criterion of insurgent groups, they are not the same as Bard O’Neill 
(1990:3) clearly distinguishes the two phenomena by including an overtly political component in his definition 
of insurgency: 
A struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group 
consciously uses political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and 
demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one 
or more aspects of politics.  
 
Thus, insurgencies combine violence with political programs in pursuit of revolutionary purposes in a way that 
terrorism cannot duplicate. Terrorists may pursue political, even revolutionary goals, but their violence replaces 
rather than complements a political program. Typically, insurgents organize their forces in military fashion as 
squads, platoons, and companies. Terrorist units are usually smaller and comprised of isolated teams not 
organized into a formal military chain of command. Insurgent forces are often more overt in nature as well, 
especially in the sanctuaries or zones, which they dominate. Terrorist organizations, which tend towards extreme 
secrecy and compartmented cells to facilitate security, seldom replicate an insurgency’s political structure. One 
characteristic that does not serve to distinguish terrorism from insurgency is the use of terror tactics. Terrorists 
and insurgents may employ exactly the same methods, and utilize force or the threat thereof to coerce their target 
audiences and further the organizational agenda. Both groups may threaten, injure, or kill civilians or 
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government employees by using an array of similar means. Thus, the use of terror in and of itself does not equate 
to terrorism, the former is merely a tactical tool of the latter (Thomas, 1996).  
 
The fundamental fact about insurgency is that insurgents are weak relative to the government they are fighting, 
at least at the start of operations. If government forces knew who the rebels were and how to find them, they 
would be fairly easily destroyed or captured. The numerical weakness of the insurgents implies that, to survive, 
the rebels must be able to hide from government forces. They need arms and material, money to buy them, or 
smugglable goods to trade for them. They need a supply of recruits to the insurgent way of life, and they may 
also need information and instruction in the practical details of running an insurgency. Most important for the 
prospects of a nascent insurgency, however, are the government’s police and military capabilities and the reach 
of the government institutions into rural areas. Insurgents are better able to survive and prosper if the 
government and military they oppose are relatively weak-badly financed, organizationally inept, corrupt, 
politically divided and poorly informed about goings-on at the local level. Insurgency arises as a result of 
systemic failure and pathology in which key elites and organizations develop a vested interest in sustaining the 
conflict to achieve self-centred interests. Insurgency emerges when a group decides that the gap between their 
political expectations and the opportunities afforded them is unacceptable and can only be remedied by force. 
Insurgencies grow out of gap resulting from the failure of the state to provide security and protection against 
internal and external threats, and preserve sovereignty over territory; lack capacity to provide the citizens the 
basic needs of survival such as water, electricity, food and public health, education, communication and a 
working economic system, which may lead to loss of public confidence and ultimately political upheaval and 
lack of political legitimacy. 
 
Contemporary insurgency has a different strategic context, structure and dynamics than its forebears. Because of 
globalization, the dynamics of contemporary insurgency are more like a violent and competitive market than war 
in the traditional sense where clear and discrete combatants seek strategic victory. Insurgency like war is and 
always will be the use of violence for political purposes.  Insurgency tends to be nested in complex conflicts 
associated with state weakness or failure. It also involves what can be called third forces (armed groups which 
affect the outcome, such as militias) and fourth forces (unarmed groups which affect the outcome, such as 
international media). Thus, complex internal conflicts, especially one involving insurgency, will generate other 
adverse effects: the destabilization of regions, resource flows and markets; the blossoming of transnational 
crime, humanitarian disasters; transnational terrorism; and so forth (Metz, 2007).  
 
Insurgency also combines continuity and change, an enduring essence and a shifting nature. Its essence is 
protracted, asymmetric violence; political, legal and ethnic ambiguity; and the use of complex terrain, 
psychological warfare and political mobilization. Contemporary insurgency, then, is simply one of the many 
manifestations of declining state control and systemic weakness.  It co-exists with many others, most importantly 
the rise of militias, powerful criminal gangs and syndicates, informal economies, the collapse of state services, 
humanitarian crises or disasters, crises of identity and transnational terrorism. This means insurgency is no 
longer a “stand alone” conflict; it is ‘nested’ with deeper and broader struggles. It is still about power, but it is 
also about economics, services and social identity.    
 
As such, identity question, therefore, plays a critical part in the emergence of ethnic/religious insurgencies in 
most societies particularly in Nigeria. Identity may be defined as a combination of socio-cultural characteristics 
which individuals share, or are presumed to share, with others on the basis of which one group may be 
distinguished from others. Identity has a combination of ethnic, religious, gender, class and other layers all of 
which refer to the same person either in self definition or as defined by others. Identity in this sense is based on 
traits which makes individuals members of a group; such traits also provide responses to the question, “who am 
I?” (Alubo, 2009). Thus, people who might see themselves as different may be seen by others as “one of them”, 
and used as a key factor in identity politics. Identity is also about meanings in relations to social existence. In its 
multi-layered nature, there is the tendency for some layers to dominate in particular circumstances. Depending 
on the circumstance, the crucial layer may spell inclusion, exclusion and violence. It is in this sense that 
Mohamed Kuna was right in arguing that identity has both objective and subjective components: 
 
 
An identity is a distinguishing label that objectively exists, is subjectively felt, and enables its 
bearers to experience individually and collectively a sense of solidarity. As a label, it can be 
assumed by, or imposed on bearers. It is also a prism by which objects, people, and 
collectivities are sorted, organized, mapped and ordered into meaningful and understandable 
units. Identities are socially constructed, dynamic and multi-faceted. Subjectively, 
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identification with a category is simultaneously a definition of self, so that groups come to 
identify themselves as ethnic, religious, occupational, national and other terms. Objectively, 
individuals do not identify in general, but do so in relation to others’ definition of themselves 
and the boundaries implied in such definitions (Kuna, 2004:33).   
The complex and often contentious nature of the concept makes identity politics a natural outcome. Identity 
politics is used here to denote the process of categorizing and de-categorizing people (ethnic, religious, gender, 
etc) into groups on the bases of shared and presumed similarities. More often than not, such similarities may be 
based on assumptions and stereotypes rather than actual traits, attributes or characteristics. There is thus a regular 
sense of “in their character” or, in the more popular Nigerian pigeon English, “na dem-dem or na one of them”, 
even when differences between people being pigeon holed into one group are striking. Such categorizing and de-
categorizing has become the basis for a range of issues related to rights, opportunities, privileges and 
entitlements. Identity politics is a basis for determining who is in and who is out (Alubo, 2003) and hence there 
are contestations and struggle to maintain the status-quo by those favoured and for change by those left out in the 
cold.    
Identity in its ethnic and religious forms is central to the citizenship and nation building question in Nigeria 
because it is the basis for inclusion and exclusion. The issue becomes much more crucial because, as in most of 
Africa, citizenship is tied to group rights and thus, inextricably linked with identity. In effect, identity is a form 
in which the citizenship and the indigene/settler questions are posed and practically experienced, especially in 
relation to material and political position issues. Citizenship here is defined as a relationship between the 
individual and the state in relation to mutual rights, duties and obligations. Citizenship is also a form of 
participation in the running of the state and society, and in this sense an agency and subject. A citizen as spelt out 
in the 1999 constitution is one: 
 Born in Nigeria before the date of independence either of whose parents or any of grandparents belong 
to a community indigenous to Nigeria. Provided a person shall not become a citizen of Nigeria by 
virtue of this section if neither of his parents nor any of his grandparents was born in Nigeria.  
 Every person born in Nigeria after the date of independence either of whose parents or any of 
grandparents is a citizen of Nigeria.  
 Every person born outside Nigeria either of whose parents is a citizen of Nigeria (Chapter 3, section 1). 
 There are also provisions for naturalization and for foreigners to apply for Nigerian citizenship. 
 The challenge with the issue of citizenship rights and privileges in Nigeria has to do with the translation of its 
provisions in the day-to-day lives of the people. Part of this complication is the division of Nigerian citizens into 
indigene and settler categorization or classification. As used in local parlance, an indigene is synonymous with 
native, autochthon and “son/daughter- of the soil”, and refers to ascribed identity of being born in a particular 
location into a specific ethnic group considered to have a “homeland” within the locality. To be an indigene of a 
place therefore means that the ethnic group can point to a territory as “native land” where such native land is in a 
local council or state. This position is more concisely expressed by Sam Egwu who asserts that “Indigeneity” of 
a state is conferred on a person whose parents or grandparents were members of a community indigenous to a 
particular state (Egwu, 2003:37; 209). Thus Nigerians, who have their ethnic genealogy elsewhere, even if they 
were born in a particular state or lived all their lives there, are regarded as “settlers” (Alubo, 2006; Ibrahim 
2006). A settler is regarded as a stranger, a sojourner who may have been born in a location but is regarded as a 
bird of passage who would ultimately go “home”. In the Nigerian experience, being an indigene or a settler is a 
permanent identity, as there is no provision for the latter to convert to the former. The classification of Nigerians 
into indigenes and settlers creates problems because it is a basis for citizenship rights, entitlements and access to 
opportunities. Nigerians’ daily experiences are replete with tales of denial, exclusion and discrimination of some 
groups on one hand, and access, inclusion and a sense of belonging by other groups on the other in such issues as 
employment, admissions into schools, scholarships, political elections and appointments. 
In daily encounters, identity and its politics are the bases of contestations for inclusions in opportunities and 
rights as are available to others. Many of these contestations result in violence. In such conflicts, holders of 
particular identities as defined by the attackers are singled out for liquidation, forced to relocate and their 
properties torched. The collective nature of the violence is perhaps serving to strengthen geo-political solidarity. 
This is further heightened given the near absence of material benefits attached to Nigerian citizenship. This gap 
is filled by ethnic and religious development associations and thus serving to reinforce divisions. The rise in geo-
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-574X (Paper)  ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) 
Vol.29, 2015 
 
45 
ethnic movements also serves to weaken national integration as the first priority of various associations such as 
the Afenifere is the Yoruba, the Ohaneze is the Ndigbo and the Arewa Consultative Forum is the Hausa-Fulani. 
Similar geopolitical associations exist from the Middle Belt minorities as well as for oil bearing Niger Delta 
Region. These geo-political movements were preceded by identity construction and reconstruction which 
provided the bases for further divisions into majorities and minorities and people give their loyalties to these 
social formations rather than the state. This division becomes evident each time state and local council creation 
exercises are carried out in the country. However, the creation of states and local councils has not in themselves, 
solved the problems of a sense of belonging and integration, nor have they allayed the fears of domination 
(Alubo, 2004). Instead, these exercises create additional theatres for contestations, as new majorities and 
minorities are created in the process. The exclusions and denial of rights and opportunities on the basis of 
identity has resulted in many cases of violence, especially since the return of civil rule in 1999. Identity conflicts 
have also been experienced in Ife-Modakeke, Umulerei Aguleri and virtually all over the country.  
NATION BUILDING AND STATE DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA 
The concern for nation building as a policy to promote State building in societies with multiple ethnic and 
religious cleavages is critical in an African continent characterized by issues of underdevelopment, political 
instability, conflict, insurgencies and human development challenges (Miguel, 2004:326; Collier, 2009). Thus an 
internally driven, dynamic and developing process of democratic governance would underpin successful nation 
building, state construction and development in Nigeria and other African countries. Lack of democratic 
governance, conflict and underdevelopment therefore has continuously weakened nation building, undermined 
State construction and subverted socioeconomic development which continually undermine the people’s well-
being and degrade human condition in most States in the African continent (Andebrhan, 2010). The existence of 
violent conflicts have had a dreadful impact on the most vulnerable members of society, especially women and 
children, with children making up half of all civilian war casualties (Food 4 Africa, 2009). Half of the people in 
sub-Saharan Africa live on less than a dollar a day, while 33 percent of the continent’s people suffer from 
malnutrition (Food 4 Africa, 2009:1). An estimated 20,000 Africans die every day due to extreme poverty 
manifested in chronic food shortages, malnutrition, and hunger. Hundreds of millions of people in large parts of 
Africa are locked in a daily struggle for survival, competing for increasingly scarce resources to eke out the food, 
water and energy needed to sustain life at the margins of death. It is in the light of this concern that it is 
important to interrogate what nation building is and how it contributes to national development, what are the 
factors that constitute nation building as well as the challenges associated with it.  
To begin, nation building is all about promoting the collective well-being of the people through meeting their 
needs, interests and aspirations (Agbese et al. 2007:4). Its hallmarks would be the pursuit of liberty, social 
justice, progress and prosperity for the people by government and its institutions. Nation building is therefore a 
product of conscious statecraft built by men and women with vision and doggedness, and not mere wishful 
thinking. Nation building is always a work in progress; a dynamic process in constant need of nurturing and re-
invention. Nation building is about building a common sense of purpose, a sense of shared destiny, a collective 
imagination of belonging (Gambari, 2008). In today’s world, skills, industriousness, productivity and 
competitiveness are the determinant factors of national greatness and not the size of its population or the 
abundance of its natural resources. Thus, the real wealth of a nation is its people and their capacity to engender 
productivity, creativity and industriousness. 
 
Nation building has many important aspects. Firstly, it is about building a political entity which corresponds to a 
given territory based on some generally accepted norms, rules, and values, and a common citizenship. Secondly, 
it is about building institutions which symbolize the political entity- institutions such as the bureaucracy, an 
economy, the judiciary, universities, civil service and civil society organizations. Thirdly, the quality of 
leadership anchored on transparency, accountability and openness is critical to building a viable and prosperous 
nation.  Since the 1960s in Africa when most nations including Nigeria had their independence, the matter of 
nation-building has taken precedence over all other tasks, including economic development (Zolberg, 1967:461). 
Most of the policies on national integration have always centred on such issues as changing of state name, capital 
city or currency, postage stamps, land nationalization, identity cards, military conscription and national service 
etc whose effects on national formation has been considered subtle rather than unimportant (Billig, 1995; 
Alapiki, 2005).  Similarly, Young (2004) previously noted how innumerable rituals of state drummed the 
national idea into the public consciousness: national holidays, national anthems, daily flag-raising ceremonies at 
all administrative headquarters. However, an examination of the implementation of these nation building policies 
by various governments in promoting national integration and its effects on national development has been 
varied. Studies have shown that many of these nation-building policies were merely seen as smokescreen to 
advance the interests of the government in power; for other societies it led to more conflict than integration, 
(Moore, 1984:173; Potts, 1985). Similarly, some other studies have revealed that nation- building policy such as 
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land nationalization has led to more increasing inequalities as locals saw their land increasingly occupied by 
migrants which eventually contributed to the outbreak of violent “son of the soil’ conflict as was the case in 
Rwanda, Somalia, Central Africa (Green, 2010). Also, in communities where oil is extracted such as in the Niger 
Delta, conflict has often arisen with the national government and multi-national corporations over local 
complaints that the community does not adequately reap the benefit of such resources or suffers excessively 
from the degradation of the natural environment. In all, inter-regional inequalities, intense competition for 
political power by the elite, weak states, politics of repression, exclusion, marginalization, widespread 
mismanagement, rampant corruption and democratic governance deficits provoke discontent at the centre which 
ultimately breeds resistance, violence and civil wars on the periphery.  All these forces undermine nation-
building, undercut state construction, hinder national development and vitiate state fragility.  
 
Therefore, nation-building is the most common form of collective identity formation with a view to legitimizing 
public power within a given territory. This is an essentially indigenous process which often not only projects a 
meaningful future but also draws on existing traditions, institutions, and customs, redefining them as national 
characteristics in order to support the nation’s claim to sovereignty and uniqueness. A successful nation-building 
process produces a cultural projection of a nation containing a certain set of assumptions, values and beliefs 
which can function as the legitimizing foundation of a state structure. This has happened essentially in societies 
with substantial elements of social modernity. Among the elements which distinguish such societies from pre-
modern ones, are; an open system of stratification allowing and encouraging social mobility, the state as an 
impersonal form of government, the pursuit of economic growth and a cultural system  establishing collective 
meaning and identity for all envisaged members of society (Greenfeld, 2004).       
 
Nation failure on the other hand, occurs when in a particular state nationhood no longer provides the foundation 
for accepting public power. In other words, the cultural projection of a nation is no longer convincing to many; 
there is no consensus on the cultural traditions, customs, symbols, rituals and the historical experiences- there is 
no ‘usable past”. Nation failure thus describes a process in which the requirements of normal politics, the social 
substratum essential for the acceptance of majority and redistribution decisions disappear. Nation failure exists 
when the underlying willingness of the population to accept rules, decisions and measures adopted by a common 
government is altered. A situation like this can likely descend into violence and civil war. Here, the individual 
communities may define themselves by the shared religion, class, language, or ethnicity, different to that of the 
other communities. The key essence here is that once this condition sets in, individual and mutually exclusive 
nationalisms replace the former common identity. Then militant and violent community leaders, often termed as 
‘elites’, might create an atmosphere of fear in which war in the name of national self-defense appears to a 
significant part of the affected population to be not only reasonable, but perhaps, even the only solution. The 
collapse of Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular, are examples of what can happen in 
such a case. Along these characteristics irreconcilable dissensions can emerge that make it unlikely if not 
impossible that government decisions will be adhered to by the populace. 
 
Thus a critical component required for the attainment of nation-building would be the inculcation of the spirit of 
nationalism which is a vital ingredient in the drive for national development and nationhood. Nationalism 
therefore entails loyalty or devotion to a nation. It is synonymous with patriotism which must reflect wholly in 
the attitude that members of a nation have about their national identity, including the attainment and sustenance 
of self-determination (Stanford Encyclopedia, 2010). Equally related to the discourse of nationalism is the issue 
of ideology which is a set of doctrines or beliefs that form the basis of a political, economic or social system 
(Rodney, 2007:437). As a body of ideas it should reflect the social needs and aspirations of an individual, group, 
class or culture. Ideology must be anchored on ethics and powered by moral considerations otherwise it becomes 
unfocussed, shifty, irrelevant, undetermined, self-serving, unproductive and dehumanizing. At the political level, 
the ethics and moral considerations of equity, justice, compassion, truth, respect and care for humanity must be 
the guiding principle for the survival of the state. Hence in the context of modern-day nationhood, the concept of 
nation-building should necessarily incorporate a form of revolutionary ideals (marked departure from the old 
absolutism of rulers and subjects or maintenance of status-quo ante bellum) to a new ideology of cooperation, 
integration and partnership as the art of statehood between the leader and the led such that the governors and the 
governed are seen as partners in the national project of governance and societal development.  
 
Relating this to the Nigerian context, it is obvious that since independence, Nigeria and its people have been 
struggling with different approaches to build the country and set it on the path of political, cultural, social and 
economic advancement. Over time the country has tried different political systems, implemented numerous 
economic measures, adopted various educational policies and evolved variety of transformation efforts to 
facilitate the process of nation building. Yet, Nigeria has remained a nation seized by the drawbacks of 
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-574X (Paper)  ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) 
Vol.29, 2015 
 
47 
development in the form of increasing poverty, conflict, corruption, poor governance, materialism, weak 
institutions, political misbehaviour, general indiscipline and infrastructural weaknesses, among others (Pate, 
2013). The growth and development level of the nation have continuously failed to correlate with the quantum of 
resources allegedly expended over the years. Arguably, the very slow progress being experienced in the 
country’s nation-building process can be related to factors mentioned above including disregard for ethics and 
morality in governance, leadership impunity, disrespect for agreements, bureaucratic dishonesty and self-centred 
attitudes. Such unethical behaviour and negative values have exerted serious consequences on the country’s 
reputation in the committee of nations. Consequently, fifty-four years after independence, the country is still far 
from the point where trust and confidence amongst and between the people of Nigeria define and drive 
relationships and interactions at all levels in the country. It is the light of the foregoing that we must begin to 
interrogate the role of the state in nation-building and development.  This is where leadership and governance are 
centred and institutions are built to drive the vision, values and objectives of nation-building and development. 
 
The state or government represents the organized embodiment of political processes within society- the means 
by which decisions are made and social life is directed and regulated (Goldstone, 2000). The state arises in 
human societies because of the need to provide a credible threat to force the creation of public goods. Such threat 
requires that the state organize and monopolize the use of organized coercion which is legitimate. According to 
Weber (1921, 1946), the essence of the state or government is that it “claims the monopoly of the legitimate use 
of physical force” within its boundaries. As such, the ability to exercise political power rests, in part, on the 
beliefs of those subject to that power. Authority therefore exists where there is willing compliance of a group of 
people to the directive of the superior. The state therefore represents the system for the organization of power, 
and politics creates the platform where persons strive for the exercise of political power either as a means in 
serving other aims, ideal or egoistic, or as power for its own sake. Political power here represents power 
exercised within a group which occupies a relatively well defined territory by a person or sets of persons 
responsible for the maintaining the order and integrity of the group as a community and whose commands are 
supported by the use of legitimate force.  
 
Thus, without a collective good such as security of persons or property against harmful actions by other group 
members, people will not be able to remain within the group. As such, the primary function of the state is to 
preserve internal order, make life predictable and secure. The state also exists to provide the collective good of 
external security and all other goods which its members could not individually provide for themselves, such as 
basic infrastructure, healthcare, education etc. In other words, the state is responsible for providing for the 
common defense, insure domestic tranquility, establish justice and promote the general welfare of the people it 
governs. However, the greatest of all social dilemmas with respect to the state lies in whether those who control 
the means of coercion or domination (power) will act in their own interests rather than for the public good 
particularly in the way economic goods and services are distributed and used. It is within this context that one 
can begin to understand how the failure of the state to perform its statutory functions to its citizenry can trigger 
off incidences of unrest, rebellion, violence, insurgencies and most time civil wars.  
 
State failure occurs when public institutions fail to deliver positive political goods to citizens on a scale likely to 
undermine the legitimacy and existence of the state (Rotberg, 2003:1). State failure exist in respect to wide range 
of political goods of which the most important ones are the provision of security, a legal system to adjudicate 
disputes, provision of economic and communication infrastructures, the supply of some form of welfare policies 
and increasing opportunities for participation in the political process. The degree to which individual states are 
capable of delivering those political goods significantly influence their relative strength, weakness or failure. 
There is a great variety of causes of state failure. In addition to those already mentioned; economic 
underdevelopment, failures made by the former colonial powers in general and the drawing of arbitrary post-
colonial borders in particular, lack of democracy, misgovernment, widespread poverty, problematic economic 
policies and programmes instituted by the IMF and the World Bank (Crocker, 2003).  
 
In the same vein, a number of indicators for state weakness potentially leading to state failure have been 
identified: disharmony between communities, inability to control borders and the entirety of the territory, a 
growth of criminal violence, corrupt institutions and a decaying infrastructure. State weakness does not 
necessarily mean under-performance in all those categories. A number of states appear to be strong in terms of 
government institutions and control of territory while failing to deliver political goods, especially public services 
to their citizens, such as North Korea, pre-war Iraq and most countries in sub- Saharan Africa. In such countries, 
however, the state structure consists largely of the coercive structure, such that the state is likely to collapse 
together with its coercive structure. Therefore, the structure of the African States from colonial times as well as 
the nature and conduct of its operations by the national political elites during the post-colonial period can be 
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fingered as mainly responsible for fuelling and exacerbating issues of violence, unrest, militancy and incidences 
of insurgencies in most societies in Africa that ultimately undermine the nation-building process.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND ANALYSIS 
Thus, the sources of conflict in Africa reflect the diversity of the different histories, geographical conditions, 
different stages of economic development, different set of public policies, different patterns of internal and 
international interaction that characterized each country (Anan, 1998). Some sources are purely internal; some 
reflects the dynamics of the particular subregion, and some have important international dimensions. Despite 
these differences the sources of conflicts are linked by a number of common themes and experiences. The first 
source of the conflict arises from the historical legacies of the colonial powers that partitioned Africa into 
territorial units following the Berlin conference of 1884-85. Kingdoms, states and communities in Africa were 
arbitrary divided, unrelated areas and peoples were just as arbitrary joined together as in the case of Nigeria.  
 
Following the attainment of independence in the 1960s, most of the newly independent African States like 
Nigeria inherited those colonial boundaries, together with the challenge that legacy posed to their territorial 
integrity and attempts to achieve national unity. The challenge was compounded by the fact that the framework 
of colonial laws and institutions which some new States inherited had been designed to exploit local divisions, 
not to overcome them (Ibid). Too often, however, the necessary building of national unity was pursued through 
the heavy centralization of political and economic power and the suppression of political pluralism which has 
consistently undermine the forging of genuine national identity from among disparate and often competing 
communities. This structure created the platform for the existence of political monopolies which often led to 
corruption, nepotism, complacency and the abuse of power by the elites in government. 
 
Similarly, the character of the commercial relations instituted by colonialism also created long-term distortions 
in the political economy of Africa, such that transportation networks and related physical infrastructure were 
designed to satisfy the needs of trade with the metropolitan country, not to support the balance growth of an 
indigenous economy (Wallerstein, 1990). In addition to frequently imposing unfavourable terms of trade, 
economic activities that were strongly skewed towards extractive industries and primary commodities for export 
stimulated little demand for steady and widespread improvements in the skills and educational levels of the 
workforce. The consequences of this pattern of production and exchange spilled over into the post independent 
State. As political competition was not rooted in viable national economic systems, in many instances, the 
prevailing structure of incentives favoured capturing the institutional remnants of the colonial economy for 
factional advantage.  
Looking beyond the challenge of colonial legacy, the real cause(s) of conflict in Africa, and Nigeria to be 
specific that has snowballed into issues of insecurity, unrest between and amongst communities over land, settler 
and indigene crisis, militancy, insurgencies and more recently terrorism lies in the nature of political power, 
together with the real and perceived consequences of capturing and maintaining power by the elites. It is 
frequently the case that political victory assumes a winner-takes-all form with respect to wealth and resources, 
patronage and the prestige and prerogatives of office. This phenomenon often result to communal sense of 
advantage or disadvantage which is heightened in many cases by reliance on centralized and highly personalized 
forms of governance. Where there is insufficient accountability of leaders, lack of transparency in regimes, 
inadequate checks and balances, non-adherence to the rule of law, absence of peaceful means to change or 
replacement of leaders, or lack of respect for human rights, political control becomes excessively competitive 
and the stakes become dangerously high. This situation is exacerbated when the state is the major provider of 
employment, social services and welfare; and political parties are largely either regionally or ethnically based. In 
such circumstances, the multi-ethnic character of most African States makes conflicts even more likely, leading 
to an often violent politicization of ethnicity. In extreme cases, rival communities may perceive that their 
security, perhaps their very survival, can be ensured only through control of the State power. Conflict in such 
cases becomes virtually inevitable.  
 
Consequently, other interests external to Africa through the activities of transnational corporations who compete 
for oil and other precious resources in Africa continue to play a large and sometimes decisive role, both in 
suppressing conflict and in sustaining it. Foreign interventions are not limited, however, to sources beyond 
Africa. Neigbouring state, inevitably affected by conflicts taking place within other States, may also have 
significant interests, not all of them necessarily benign. While African peacekeeping and mediation efforts have 
become more prominent in recent years, the role that African governments play in supporting, sometimes even 
instigating, conflicts in neigbouring countries must be clearly acknowledged. Also, there is the need to take 
cognizance of those who profit from chaos and lack of accountability and who may have little or no interest in 
stopping a conflict and much interest in prolonging it. Very high on the list of those who profit from conflict in 
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Africa are international arms merchants as well as the protagonists of the conflicts themselves. For instance, in 
Liberia, the control and exploitation of diamonds, timber and other raw materials was one of the principal 
objectives of the warring factions. The same can be said of Angola, where protracted difficulties in the peace 
process owed much to the importance of control over the exploitation of the country’s lucrative diamond fields. 
Control over these resources financed the various factions and gave them the means to sustain the conflict. 
Clearly, many of the protagonists had a strong financial interest in seeing the conflict prolonged.  
 
Furthermore, studies and available evidences have showed that ethnicity and religious differences are not the 
reasons for the perpetuation of insecurity, unrest, violence and conflicts in the country; rather these tools are 
manipulated by the political elites not to advance political consciousness but to exploit the naivety of the people 
in their quest to secure political power (Ake, 2000). The political class or elites in government have consistently 
failed to manage the affairs of the nations and its resources in terms of providing the people with better living 
conditions. They have also failed to adequately address the key fundamental issues that permeate the Nigerian 
State which include matters such as revenue allocation, fiscal federalism, devolution of power, minority rights, 
the conditions of tenure of public offices, the form of government, balance of power between the three levels of 
government. Today, there is a general consensus among development scholars, policy makers and development 
institutions and organizations that the root cause of the country’s development predicament lie squarely at the 
foot of bad leadership which result from lack of capacity to rise to the responsibility of effectively managing the  
nation’s resources and affairs at all levels (Achebe, 1984; ECA, 2012). Also, available statistics have shown that 
since Nigeria’s return to civilian rule in 1999, the country has not fared better in the UNDP Human Development 
Index (HDI) ranking, such that over 70 percent of the population live below the poverty line, infant/child and 
maternal mortality is one of the highest in the world behind China and India, more than 10.5 million of children 
are out of school, unemployment is over 20 percent and life expectancy less than 52 years ( UNDP, 2010; NBS, 
2013; UNICEF, 2010). 
 
Also, a cursory look at the Ibrahim Index of African Governance ranking for African Nations, Nigeria was rated 
as one of the worst governed countries in Africa as she was rated 45.8 percent as against the African average of 
51.5 percent, with 37th position out of 52 in the overall governance scale (IIAG, 2014; The Punch Newspaper, 
2014). The country also scored lower than the regional average for West Africa which stands at 52.2 percent and 
ranked 12th out of 15 countries in the region. Besides, Nigeria also received dismal ratings in such categories as 
safety and the rule of law where it is ranked 44th with 38.1 percent, 32nd in the rule of law with 41.0 percent and 
30th in accountability with 36.6 percent. The country got the lowest rating in personal security where it is ranked 
49th with 16.5 percent and second lowest in national security where it is ranked 48th with 58.2 percent.  All these 
data go to buttress the obvious reality that where good governance is absence, it breeds ground for propagation 
and perpetuation of anti-social vices, including other act of criminality such as kidnapping, ritual killings, violent 
protests, insurgency and terrorism which tend to result from struggle for incorporation, from marginalization, 
domination and exclusion.  Thus, violence, unrests, insurgencies and criminal activities thrives mostly in a 
deeply flawed States with serious social inequalities, repression and massive corruption.  
 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that the critical factor needed to attain successful nation building in 
Nigeria is responsible leadership anchored on the pursuit of a democratic development project. While it is 
acknowledged that complex internal conflicts, especially will generate other adverse effects such as the 
destabilization of regions, destruction of lives and properties, blossoming of transnational crimes, humanitarian 
disasters and transnational terrorism as it is happening in the North East of Nigeria, the solution to resolving this 
issue lies in the collective resolve of the Nigerian people to look beyond the parochial interests of ethnicity and 
religion,  and seek for the entrenchment of a truly democratic State where  the rule of law, equal opportunity, 
accountability of power is fully enforced and implemented to the letter. There is also the need to create genuine 
structures of social inclusion for all Nigerians irrespective of age, sex, religion or ethnicity; a developmental 
State and leadership that will engender a common spirit of civic citizenship backed by the guarantee of basic 
citizenship rights by the State. Besides, tackling poverty in the country, the State should create avenues for 
ordinary citizens to earn a decent living which will go a long way to address the question of ethnic political 
mobilization.  
A social contract of sorts between the state and the citizens should emphasize the reciprocity between the actions 
of the State and the responsibilities of the citizenry. Also, there is an urgent demand for the state to muster the 
right political will to make laws that stipulate stiff penalty for individuals, groups and organizations with 
underline philosophy that preaches division and hatred amongst the various groups that constitute the Nigerian 
nation either on the platform of religion or ethnicity.  Besides, the sponsors of these sinister bodies must be 
fished out and severely dealt so as to send a strong message to others who would want to toe such lines in the 
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future. Furthermore, Nigerians must come to the realization that using violence to resolve whatever grievances 
they may have against the state and other persons or groups will only make us worse off as lives that are wasted 
cannot be recovered and properties destroyed will take a long time to rebuild. Therefore, there is the need for all 
Nigerians irrespective of their ethnic or religious leanings to seek non-violent measures and other alternative 
conflict resolution mechanism to resolve whatever ill-feelings they may have against the state and the political 
leaders at all levels.    
This study remains an ongoing conversation in Nigeria and provides plenty of room for future research using 
quantitative approaches to test the constructs of ethnicity, religious insurgency and nation building in Nigeria. 
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